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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

WILFRED A. VIGIL, JR.,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 900166
Priority No. 2

:

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The issue presented in the State7s petition for rehearing
is whether this Court properly concluded that "the crime of
attempted depraved indifference homicide does not exist in Utah."
State v. Viail. Case No. 900166, slip op. at 9 (Utah September 3,
1992) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Statement of the Case contained in the State's
petition for rehearing sets forth the posture of this case. A copy
of the opinion issued by this Court in State v. Viail. Case No.
900166 (Utah September 3, 1992) is contained in Addendum A.
In a Minute Entry dated September 24, 1992, this Court
requested that Defendant/Appellant Wilfred Vigil respond to the
State's petition.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
As this Court recognized in its opinion, "the facts are
unimportant to the issue" raised in this case.
at 1.

Viail. slip op.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court correctly decided that attempted depraved
indifference homicide is not a crime in Utah, based on the language
of the relevant statutes, the Model Penal Code (MPC) and Utah case
law.

Case law from other jurisdictions and the logical

impossibility of such a crime also demonstrate the correctness of
this Court's decision.
The State's petition for rehearing blurs the distinction
between the "knowing" mental state proscribed in Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-5-202 and 76-5-203(1)(a) and the "depraved indifference"
mental state of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(c).

These are two

distinct mental states, the former of which requires that the actor
know that death is the inevitable consequence of his actions whereas
depraved indifference requires only that the actor know he created a
grave risk of death.
While the MPC arguably supports a determination that
attempt can exist where an actor has knowledge that his conduct will
cause a death as proscribed by Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a), the
MPC suggests that an actor cannot commit an attempt where he only
has knowledge that his conduct has created a grave risk of death.
Furthermore, despite the suggestion in the MPC that attempted
homicide might be a crime where the actor had knowledge his conduct
would cause a death, only a minority of jurisdictions has adopted
this interpretation.

The State's request that this Court give an

expansive meaning to the term "intent" in Utah Code Ann.

- 2
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§ 76-4-101(2) is not supported by the language of the statute, rules
of statutory construction or case law from this Court.

ARGUMENT
POINT. THIS COURT FOLLOWED THE RELEVANT STATUTES
AND EXISTING CASE LAW IN REACHING ITS DECISION
THAT ATTEMPTED DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE HOMICIDE IS
NOT A CRIME.
In a carefully reasoned decision based on accepted rules
of statutory construction, Utah case law and the Model Penal Code,
this Court correctly held that attempted depraved indifference
homicide is not a crime in Utah.

Vigil, slip op. at 9.

In analyzing Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1) (the second
degree murder statute) and Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (the attempt
statute), this Court looked first to the plain language of the
statutes, then properly applied the following two rules of statutory
construction:

(1) "specific statutory provisions take precedence

over general statutory provisions.

E.g.. Osuala v. Aetna Life &

Casualty. 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980)"; and (2) "statutory
provisions should be construed to give full effect to all their
terms.

E.g.. Shurtz fv. BMW of N.Am.. Inc.]. 814 P.2d [1108] at

1112 [(Utah 1991)]."

Vigil, slip op. at 4.

This Court also recognized that the State's position in
this case is inconsistent with this Court's prior decisions in
State v. Bell. 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989), State v. Norman. 580 P.2d
237 (Utah 1978), and State v. Howell. 649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982).

In

Bell, this Court stated that to be guilty of an attempt, one must

- 3
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intend to consummate the underlying crime, and that to be guilty of
an attempted murder, one must intend to kill.
394.

Bell, 785 P.2d at

This Court also stated in Bell;
Indeed, in the face of logic, it is inescapable
that the crime of attempted murder requires
proof of intent to kill.

Id.

In oral argument in this case, the State acknowledged that

these cases require an intent to kill, but asked this Court to give
the term "intent to kill" an expansive interpretation which is not
supported by the language of the statute or prior case law.
In its petition for rehearing, the State raises
essentially the identical argument that is presented to the Court on
direct appeal.

First, the State quotes a passage from the Model

Penal Code that it quoted in its appellate brief, claiming again
that such passage supports its argument that the Model Penal Code
envisioned a crime of attempted depraved indifference homicide.
State's petition for rehearing at 4-5.
As Mr. Vigil pointed out in his reply brief at 2-3, the
quoted passage refers specifically to Section 5.01(b) of the MPC.
The language of 1(b) was not adopted in Utah.

Furthermore, that

section refers to situations where the actor has the purpose of
causing a specific result or the belief that his conduct will cause
a specific result.

By contrast, depraved indifference requires only

a knowledge by the actor that he or she has created a grave risk of
death, not that death will be the inevitable consequence of his

- 4

actions.

See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984). 1

Although there is a fine line between these two concepts, they
nevertheless are distinct mental states.
The quoted passage refers to a hypothetical situation in
which the actor intends to demolish a building by detonating a bomb
"knowing that persons were in the building and they would be killed
by the explosion."

1 Amer. L. Inst., Model Penal Code and

Commentaries, 304-5 (1985) (emphasis added).

This type of knowing

mental state is distinguishable from depraved indifference since the
death of the occupants is the inevitable consequence of the
actions.

In a depraved indifference scenario, although a grave risk

of death is created, death is not the inevitable consequence.2
In addition to the portion of the MPC quoted by the
State, the MPC also states:
[A]n actor commits an attempt when he does or
omits to do anything with the purpose of
causing "or with belief that it will cause"

1. In Fontana, 680 P.2d at 1046, this Court arrived at the
requisite mental state for depraved indifference by default, after
rejecting both "intentionally" and "recklessly" as possible mental
states. However, the knowledge required for depraved indifference
is "knowledge that his conduct created a grave risk of death to
another." Id. at 1047. This contrasts with knowledge that the
conduct will cause death, as proscribed by subsection 1(a) of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-203.
2. In a situation where the actor knows his conduct will cause a
death, a charge under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a) rather than
§ 76-5-203(1)(c) is appropriate. While a person who detonates a
building knowing that people are inside could be charged
alternatively with depraved indifference homicide when the people
die, the scenario described in the MPC comment involves knowledge
that the people will die and not the depraved indifference scenario
where there is only a grave risk they will die.
- 5

-

such result without further conduct on his
part. Thus, a belief that death will ensue
from the actor's conduct . . . will suffice, as
well as a purpose to bring about the results.
MPC, art. 5, § 501.
Although the comment suggests that an attempt might exist
where the actor knew that his conduct would result in death, "folnly
a minority of recent decisions have explicitly followed the Model
Penal Code on this point."
at 305 (emphasis added).

State's appellate brief at 9, citing MPC
Furthermore, the issue before this Court

is not whether one who acts with knowledge that his conduct will
result in death can commit an attempted homicide.

The issue is

whether one can be guilty of an attempt where he acts with depraved
indifference, a distinct mental state from knowing that conduct will
cause death.
In relying on the quoted passage, the State fails to
consider the remainder of the same comment.

Immediately prior to

the quoted passage, the comment points out that where an actor
engages in conduct which recklessly or negligently creates a risk of
death,

,f

[t]he approach of the Model Penal Code is not to treat such

behavior as an attempt."

Id. at 304. More importantly, immediately

after the passage quoted by the State, the comment states:
Since a particular crime must actually be
intended, the charge must be precise and must
not permit the jury to convict the actor on one
of several mental states. Thus when the charge
is attempted murder or assault with intent to
kill, it is error to permit conviction on a
finding of reckless disregard for human life
(footnote omitted) or intent to inflict
grievous bodily harm (footnote omitted). And
since a conviction for murder can be premised
- 6
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on either of these mental states—as well as on
intent to kill—it is improper to say that one
can be convicted of attempted murder if he
could have been convicted of murder had the
victim died. There must be a specific intent
to kill.
Id. at 306-7 (emphasis added).
The comment, read as a whole, indicates that attempted
depraved indifference homicide was not a crime envisioned by the
MPC.

In its opinion, this Court correctly recognized that the MPC

did not envision a crime of attempted depraved indifference
homicide.

Vigil, slip op. at 6.
The State's argument in its petition for rehearing blurs

the concepts of knowing that conduct will cause death and depraved
indifference.

First degree murder under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202

requires that the actor intentionally or knowingly cause the death
of another.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a) defines second degree

murder as intentionally or knowingly causing the death of another.
The knowing mental state in each of these subsections requires that
the actor be "aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause
the result."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103.

In other words, for one to

act with such a knowing mental state, he must be aware that death is
the inevitable consequence of his actions.
The issue before the Court in the present case is not
whether an attempt exists where the actor knew that his conduct
would result in a death.

Instead, the issue is whether an attempt

can exist where the actor knew that he created a grave risk of death
to another.

In analyzing the MPC and State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903
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(Utah 1982), the State blurs the distinction and treats these two
mental states as if they were identical.
The State claims in its petition that "even this Court
could not completely accept its narrow reading of section
76-4-101(2)" because in footnote 5, this Court points out that
"Maestas is still good law insofar as it authorizes prosecution for
attempted aggravated murder under the intentional or knowing
formulation of 76-5-202(1) or attempted murder under the intentional
or knowing formulation of section 76-5-203(1)(a)."

State's petition

for rehearing at 7-8; Vigil, slip op. at 8 n.5.
Contrary to the State's assertion, retention of Maestas
for that proposition can be reconciled with the holding in this
case.

The knowing mental state this Court referred to in footnote 5

is the knowledge that the conduct will cause death, i.e. that death
is the inevitable consequence of the actions.

This mental state is

the mental state involved in the situation where an actor detonates
a bomb knowing the people in the building will die.

As the MPC

points out, the term "intent" is somewhat ambiguous and could
encompass this situation where the actor knew that the persons would
die as the inevitable consequence of his actions.3

3. By including the mental state which requires knowledge that the
conduct will cause death, this Court is arguably adopting the
minority position that a crime of attempted "knowledge of death"
homicide exists. To the extent that this Court is concerned about
the inclusion of the "knowing" mental state of Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-5-202(1) and 76-5-203(1)(a) as one for which an attempt can
occur, this Court could modify the opinion to delete that
reference. Removing the reference to a knowing mental state would
(continued)
- 8
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The State's position that "intent" in § 76-4-101(2) is a
"generic" term which encompasses all mental states is without
support.

At best, the State's reliance on the MPC and Black's Law

Dictionary arguably demonstrates that "intent" includes the knowing
mental state where death is the inevitable consequence of the
actions and not circumstances where the actor knew he created a
grave risk of death.

Such an expansive reading of "intent" is not,

however, supported by the remainder of the code, e.g., § 76-4-101(2)
or prior decisions of this Court which discuss the attempt statute.
The State's argument on rehearing fails to address the
fact that case law from this Court demonstrates that Utah's attempt
statute requires an intent to consummate the target offense.

See

State v. Harmon, 712 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 1986); State v. Bell, 785
P.2d 390 (Utah 1989); State v. Howell, 649 P.2d at 93-4; State v.
Norman, 580 P.2d at 239.

In order to embrace the State's position,

this Court would be required to overrule existing case law in
addition to ignoring the MPC and language of the statutes.
Other courts which have addressed the issue of whether
attempted depraved indifference murder exists have found that such a
crime is a "logical impossibility" since it requires that the actor
intend to commit an unintended killing.

See State v. Johnson, 707

(footnote 3 continued)
ease the State's concerns and would defer the issue of whether an
attempted "knowledge of death" homicide under § 76-5-202 or
§ 76-5-203(1)(a) can be committed to a case where the issue is
directly presented to the Court.
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P.2d 1174, 1177 (N.M. App. 1985); Commonwealth v. Griffin. 310 Pa.
Super- 39, 456 A.2d 171 (1983).
This Court has issued an opinion which follows the
language of the statutes, is consistent with existing case law, and
offers a straightforward approach for prosecuting charges of
attempted murder.

The concept of depraved indifference is confusing

at best in the situation where the conduct causes a death; this
Court correctly refused to further complicate the area by outlining
a crime of attempted depraved indifference which is not set forth in
the statute.

CONCLUSION
Appellant, WILFRED A. VIGIL, JR., respectfully requests
that this Court deny the State's petition for rehearing, or,
alternatively, revise the opinion in this case to require an intent
to kill without reference to the "knowledge that the conduct will
cause death" mental state.

SUBMITTED this

/?

day of October, 1992.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused ten
copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court,
332 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and four copies to
the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84114, this

2_ day of October, 1992.

<h-lcC»7y
JOAN C. WATT

DELIVERED/MAILED this

day of October, 1992.
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ADDENDUM A

This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

No. 900166

Wilfred A. Vigil, Jr.,
Defendant and Appellant.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

F I L E D
September 3, 1992

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Raymond S. Uno
Attorneys:

R. Paul Van Dam, David B. Thompson, Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff
James C. Bradshaw, Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, for
defendant

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Wilfred A. Vigil, Jr., appeals from a trial court order
denying a motion he directed against two counts of an information
filed against him. He moved to amend one count of attempted
second degree murder and to dismiss a second count of attempted
second degree murder. The sole question presented on appeal is
whether the trial court correctly ruled that Vigil could be
prosecuted for attempted second degree murder under the depraved
indifference alternative of section 76-5-203(1)(c) of the Code.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(c) (1990) (amended 1991).1 We hold
that Utah does not recognize attempted depraved indifference
homicide and reverse the trial court order denying Vigils
motion.
Because the facts are unimportant to the issue before
us, we will summarize them briefly. Vigil was charged with one
count of second degree murder, a first degree felony, id.
§ 76-5-203(1)-(2), and two counts of attempted second degree
murder, a second degree felony, id. §§ 76-5-203(1), -4-101,
1

In 1991, the legislature changed "second degree murder" to
simply "murder" and "first degree murder" to "aggravated murder."
1991 Utah Laws ch. 10, §§ 7-9 (codified as amended Utah Code Ann.
§§ 75-5-201 to -203 (Supp. 1992)).

-4-102(2). These counts arose out of his allegedly shooting a
rifle into a crowd on State Street in Salt Lake City. The
shooting resulted in the death of one person and the wounding of
two others. Before trial, Vigil moved to amend one count of the
information and dismiss another. The aim of the motion was
to delete from the information anything that would allow the jury
to find him guilty of attempted depraved indifference homicide.
The trial court denied the motion, whereupon Vigil petitioned
this court for permission to make an interlocutory appeal. We
granted his request and now consider the correctness of the trial
court's ruling.
We first state the standard of review. The question of
whether Utah recognizes attempted depraved indifference homicide
is purely a matter of statutory interpretation. Therefore, we
review the trial court's ruling for correctness and give no
deference to its conclusions. State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421,
424 (Utah 1991); City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513,
516 (Utah), cert, denied. 111 S. Ct. 120 (1990); Provo City Corp.
v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989).
The issue before us is narrow. We are asked to
determine whether proof of the "knowing" mental state required
for depraved indifference homicide under section 76-5-203(1)(c)
of the Code is sufficient to satisfy the mental state required by
Utah's attempt statute found in section 76-4-101. If we find
that the "knowing" mental state required for depraved
indifference homicide is sufficient to satisfy the attempt
statute, the* State will be able to prosecute a defendant for
attempt to commit depraved indifference homicide.
We begin with the two statutes. The first is the
second degree murder statute, which sets out several alternative
formulations of second degree murder. Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-203(1) (1990) (amended 1991). The formulation we are
concerned with is subparagraph (1)(c), the depraved indifference
formulation. Subparagraph (1) (c) , as construed by this court in
State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254, 263-64 (Utah 1988), and State
v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1046-47 (Utah 1984), provides that a
defendant may be convicted of second degree murder if he or she
killed another with a "knowing" mental state, i.e., if the
defendant knew his or her conduct created a grave risk of death
to another.2
2

In Standiford, we held that to convict a defendant of
depraved indifference homicide, the jury must find "(1) that the
defendant acted knowingly (2) in creating a grave risk of death,
(3) that the defendant knew the risk of death was grave,
(4) which means a highly likely probability of death, and
(5) that the conduct evidenced an utter callousness and
indifference toward human life." 769 P.2d at 2 64.

No. 900166

2

The other statute of concern is the attempt statute,
section 76-4-101. The mental state required by the attempt
statute is found in the first two paragraphs, as indicated by
emphasis below:
(1) For purposes of this part a person
is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if,
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise
required for the commission of the offense,
he [or she] engages in conduct constituting a
substantial step toward commission of the
offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct
does not constitute a substantial step unless
it is strongly corroborative of the actor / s
intent to commit the offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of
attempt shall arise:
(a) Because the offense attempted was
actually committed; or
(b) Due to factual or legal
impossibility if the offense could have been
committed had the attendant circumstances
been as the actor believed them to be.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (emphasis added).
To determine whether the legislature intended to
recognize attempted depraved indifference homicide, we begin with
the statutes' plain language. We will resort to other methods of
statutory interpretation only if we find the language of the
statutes to be ambiguous. See Shurtz v, BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814
P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497, 500
(Utah 1989) (per curiam).
Paragraph (1) of the attempt statute provides that an
attempt can occur whenever the actor acts with the "kind of
culpability otherwise required" for the completed crime and his
or her act is a "substantial step" toward committing the crime.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1). Because the criminal code
specifies four discrete mental states that may result in criminal
liability, i.e., intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence,
id. § 76-2-101(1), the language in paragraph (1) seems to suggest
that an attempt conviction may be based upon the incomplete
perpetration of any of the crimes in the Code.
On the other hand, paragraph (2) of the attempt statute
states that the defendant's conduct must be corroborative of his
or her "intent to commit the offense." Id. § 76-4-101(2). At

3

No. 900166

first blush, this provision appears to contradict the broad
"culpability" language in paragraph (1). While paragraph (1)
seems to allow for any mental state so long as it falls within
the "kind of culpability otherwise required" for the underlying
offense, paragraph (2) seems to require a mental state of
"intent."
However, closer examination indicates that paragraphs
(1) and (2) are not contradictory. "Culpability," the term used
in paragraph (1), and "intent," the term used in paragraph (2),
are distinct concepts. Intent is a mental state. Black's Law
Dictionary 415 (5th abr. ed. 1983). Culpability, on the other
hand, refers to blameworthiness, id. at 200; 25 C.J.S.
Culpability (1966), a value society assigns to particular
behaviors that it deems punishable. Culpability is an inclusive
term that comprehends action or omissions, the mental state with
which they are done, and the circumstances in which the acts or
omissions take place. See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott,
Jr., Criminal Law § 24 (1979) [hereinafter Criminal Law]. Thus,
although culpability includes consideration of the actor's mental
state, it is a much broader concept than intent. See 25 C.J.S.
Culpable (1966) (defining culpability as "deserving punishment
. . . or blame or censure," but noting that it does not
necessarily connote "guilt," "malice," or "guilty purpose").3
With this distinction in mind, we interpret paragraphs
(1) and (2) of section 76-4-101. In doing so, we rely on two
well-established rules of statutory construction. Cf. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-106 (requiring terms to be construed according to
their fair import). First, specific statutory provisions take
precedence over general statutory provisions. E.g., Osuala v.
Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980). Second,
statutory provisions should be construed to give full effect to
all their terms. E.g., Shurtz, 814 P.2d at 1112.
Applying these two rules to the attempt statute
resolves the apparent contradiction between paragraphs (1) and
(2). The more specific requirement of intent in paragraph (2)
(i.e., "intent to commit the [underlying] offense") takes
precedence over the general culpability requirement in paragraph
(1) (i.e., "culpability otherwise required for the commission of
the [underlying] offense"). And to give the fullest possible
effect to the terms of paragraphs (1) and (2), we construe the
culpability requirement in paragraph (1) to refer to the

3

We are aware that culpability is sometimes used interchangeably with mental state.
However, we think that this usage
is imprecise.
No. 900166
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attendant circumstances, if any, of the underlying offense and
construe the intent language in paragraph (2) to limit the
attempt statute to offenses with a mental state of "intent," In
other words, attempt can be found for uncompleted offenses that

4

"Attendant circumstances" are those circumstances that may
be required to be present for criminal liability in addition to
the requisite physical conduct, or actus reus, and the mens rea
specified for the offense. See Criminal Law § 34, at 237,
240-41. In general, mens rea means "guilty mind," that attribute
which, along with physical conduct, was required for criminal
liability under common law, see id. § 27, at 191-92, and is now
required by statute except for strict liability offenses. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101(1) ("[N]o person is guilty of an
offense unless his [or her] conduct is prohibited by law and
. . . [h]e [or she] acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly,
with criminal negligence, or with a mental state otherwise
specified . . . . " ) . The mens rea is the mental state required
in all homicide offenses for criminal liability. See id.
§ 76-2-102 ("Every offense not involving strict liability shall
require a culpable mental state . . . . " ) ; id. § 76-5-201 ("A
person commits criminal homicide if he [or she] intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or acting with a
mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the
offense, causes the death of another human being, including an
unborn child.").
Occasionally, an offense may require a certain mental state
for an attendant circumstance. For example, under section
76-5-202(1) (k) of the current Code, a person is guilty of
aggravated murder ("first degree murder" under the 1990 statute)
if he or she intentionally or knowingly causes the death of a
police officer acting in an official capacity and the person knew
or "reasonably should have known" that the decedent was a police
officer. Id. § 76-5-202(1)(k). The mens rea element for this
offense is intent or knowledge, whereas the attendant
circumstance that the decedent was a police officer requires at
least a negligent mental state. Some offenses do not have
attendant circumstances, such as the intentional or knowing
formulation of murder ("second degree murder" under the 1990
statute), which requires only conduct that intentionally or
knowingly causes the death of another. Id. § 76-5-203(1)(a).
Other offenses that do have attendant circumstances may not
require a mental state for one or all of those circumstances. An
example of the latter type of offense is the depraved
indifference formulation of murder, which requires that the
defendant act "under circumstances evidencing a depraved
indifference to human life." Id. § 76-5-203(1)(c). The
defendant's mental state under this provision is irrelevant to
the determination of this attendant circumstance; it refers
solely to objective circumstances. Fontana, 680 P.2d at 1045,
1047. See generally Criminal Law § 27, at 194-95.
5
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require "intent," even though those offenses have attendant
circumstances that require lesser mental states.
Our construction of Utah's attempt statute finds
support in the attempt provisions of the Model Penal Code ("MPC")
and the 1971 Proposed Federal Criminal Code ("PFCC"), both of
which served as bases for the Utah provision. See State v.
Pearson, 680 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) (noting that
the Utah attempt statute was modeled after the MPC version);
Loren Martin, Utah Criminal Code Outline 169 (1973) (noting that
the Utah attempt statute was modeled after section 1001 of the
PFCC); cf. 1 National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws, Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws 351-52 (1970) (relying on the stated
purposes of the MPC attempt provision as the current penalogical
thinking) [hereinafter National Commission Working Papers].
Both the MPC and PFCC provisions include two phrases
regarding the requisite mental states for attempt that are the
same as or analogous to the provisions of the Utah attempt
statute• One phrase is the "kind of culpability otherwise
required" that is also used in paragraph (1) of the Utah attempt
statute. The other phrase specifies the mental state necessary
for the conduct that constitutes the substantial step, which
corresponds to the "intent" requirement in paragraph (2) of the
Utah attempt statute. See Model Penal Code § 5.01(1), (2),
reproduced in 1 Amer. L. Inst., Model Penal Code and Commentaries
295-96 (1985) [hereinafter MPC Commentaries1; Proposed Federal
Criminal Code § 1001(1), reproduced in 1 National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Final Report of the National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws 6 (1971). The
commentaries to the MPC and PFCC attempt provisions indicate that
the clause requiring the "kind of culpability otherwise required"
for commission of the offense refers to the attendant
circumstances of the underlying offense and the requisite mental
states for those circumstances. See MPC Commentaries § 5.01, at
301, 303; National Commission Working Papers at 355. In
contrast, the commentaries make clear that both the MPC and PFCC
attempt provisions require a more culpable mental state than
recklessness for conduct that creates the substantial step. The
PFCC attempt provision requires intentional conduct, National
Commission Working Papers at 354 & n.6, and the MPC attempt
provision requires either intentional conduct or the belief that
the actor's conduct will result in the proscribed act. MPC
Commentaries § 5.01, at 303.
Despite the foregoing support for limiting the Utah
attempt provision to offenses requiring intent, the State argues
that we should define "intent" in paragraph (2) of the attempt
statute broadly to include purposeful intent and "equivalent"
mental states, specifically, that required for depraved
indifference homicide. The State reasons that this makes sense
from a policy standpoint because the culpability of a person
No. 900166
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convicted of depraved indifference second degree murder is the
same as the culpability of a person convicted of intentional
second degree murder. See Standiford, 769 P.2d at 258; Fontana,
680 P.2d at 1045. In short, the State argues that the degree of
the murder (i.e., "first" or "second") is a measure of the
societal judgment about the criminal's culpability and therefore
murders of equal degree should be treated similarly.
Notwithstanding the apparent logic of this argument,
the State's suggested interpretation of "intent" in paragraph (2)
of the attempt statute is contrary to the definition given to it
by the legislature. Section 76-2-103(1) of the Code states that
a person engages in conduct intentionally "with respect to the
nature of his [or her] conduct or to the result of his [or her]
conduct, when it is his [or her] conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result•" Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-2-103(1) (emphasis added). Normally, we presume that when
the legislature defines a term of art and later uses that term in
the same body of statutes, it intends a consistent meaning.
E.g., Cannon v. McDonald. 615 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Utah 1980).
Accordingly, the word "intent" as used in paragraph (2) of the
attempt statute should be read to mean "conscious objective or
desire." This meaning of the word "intent" obviously is
distinguishable from knowledge of the proscribed conduct or
result, which is the mental state required for depraved
indifference homicide.
Moreover, the State's position is inconsistent with our
prior decisions. In State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989), we
addressed the question of whether there could be attempted
felony-murder under subparagraph (d) of the second degree murder
statute. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1) (d) (Supp. 1989) (amended
1991). We said no, reasoning that "[t]he crime of attempted
murder does not fit within the felony-murder doctrine because an
attempt to commit a crime requires proof of an intent to
consummate the crime . . . ." 785 P.2d at 393 (emphasis added).
In two other cases, we considered attempt in the
context of Utah's manslaughter statute, which sets out three
alternative formulations of manslaughter. Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-205. Under this statute, manslaughter may arise where the
actor (i) recklessly causes death, id. § 76-5-205(1)(a),
(ii) causes death under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance, id. § 76-5-205(1)(b), or (iii) causes death under
circumstances where the actor reasonably believes that his or her
conduct is legally justifiable. Id. § 76-5-205(1)(c).
In State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237 (Utah 1978), we
addressed the first two formulations. We held that an attempt
cannot be charged where the attempted crime is the form of
manslaughter described in subparagraph (a) of the statute because
that formulation requires only the mental state of recklessness,
whereas "[a]n attempt to commit a crime is an act done with the
7
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intent to commit that crime . . . ." Id. at 239 (emphasis
added). Regarding subparagraph (b), we held that attempted
manslaughter is possible under this formulation because "the
killing may be intentional but due to mental or emotional
disturbance on the part of the defendant." Id. at 240 (emphasis
added).
We addressed the third formulation in State v. Howell.
649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982). There we held that attempted
manslaughter can be charged for a crime described under
subparagraph (c) of the manslaughter statute because the killing
proscribed under that provision must be "intentional." Id. at 94
(emphasis added). We again noted that "one cannot be guilty of
an attempt to commit a crime unless the necessary mens rea of the
completed crime is intentional conduct." Id. at 94 n.l (emphasis
added). 5
At bottom, the State seeks to replace the word "intent"
in paragraph (2) of the attempt statute with, as it says, "intent
or a mental state that is equivalent thereto" and to modify or
reject the holdings of Bell, Norman, and Howell. Although it may
make sense to allow attempt for homicide offenses that are
presumably equal in culpability to intentional murder, we believe
that the most reasonable approach, in light of the statutory
language and our cases, is to read the word "intent" in
paragraph (2) of the attempt statute as that word is defined in
section 76-2-103(1).

5

In State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (1982), we rejected an
argument that the Utah attempt statute required a higher level of
"intent" than that required for first degree murder. In so
holding, we interpreted paragraph (1) of the Utah attempt statute
as making "clear that regardless of any requirements which the
common law may impose concerning *attempt' crimes, Utah law
requires only *the kind of culpability otherwise required for the
commission of the [completed] offense.'" Id. at 904 (brackets in
original) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) (1953)).
Alternatively, we wrote that even if the Utah attempt statute
incorporated the common law requirement of intent, the mental
state required for first degree murder was sufficient to meet
that requirement. Id. at 905.
The first alternative rationale relied on in Maestas is
clearly inconsistent with our cases in Bell, Howell, and Norman
and with our holding in the instant case. Thus, that portion of
Maestas that conflicts with these cases and t o d a y s holding is
incorrect. However, we note that Maestas is still good law
insofar as it authorizes prosecution for attempted aggravated
murder under the intentional or knowing formulation of section
76-5-202(1) or attempted murder under the intentional or knowing
formulation of section 76-5-203(1)(a).
No. 900166
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Clarity is crucial to a just criminal law system.
Jurors are instructed to apply the language set forth in our
penal statutes to determine criminal liability. Articulating the
various mental states required for the various crimes in the Code
is difficult enough without giving multiple meanings to the word
"intent."
We hold that to convict a defendant of attempted second
degree murder, the prosecution must prove that the defendant had
a conscious objective or desire to cause the death of another.
Because the mental state required for depraved indifference
homicide falls short of that intent, the crime of attempted
depraved indifference homicide does not exist in Utah.
The order of the trial court denying Vigil's motion to
dismiss and amend is reversed.

WE CONCUR:

Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice

Richard C. Howe, Associate
Chief Justice

I. Daniel Stewart, Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900166
Priority No. 2

WILFRED A. VIGIL, JR.,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Mr. Vigil refers this Court to his opening brief for the
statements of jurisdiction, the issue, standard of review, the
facts, and the case. Appellant's opening brief at 1-3.

The actual

facts alleged by the State are not necessary for this Court to
resolve the legal issue presented in this interlocutory appeal.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Model Penal Code, Utah case law, and case law from
other jurisdictions support Mr. Vigil's argument that attempted
depraved indifference homicide does not constitute an offense.
actual intent to kill—not a mental state of equivalent
culpability—is required for an attempted murder.

ARGUMENT
POINT. CASE LAW AND THE MODEL PENAL CODE SUPPORT
MR. VIGILS ARGUMENT THAT ATTEMPTED DEPRAVED
INDIFFERENCE HOMICIDE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN
OFFENSE.

An

The State argues that "Utah's attempt statute, section
76-4-101, is derived from the Model Penal Code," and that a comment
to Model Penal Code, art. 5, § 501 (1985) ("M.P.C.") suggests that
attempted depraved indifference murder is a viable crime in Utah.
See State's brief at 8-10.

In making such an argument, the State

misreads the portion of the comment which it quotes on pages 8-9 of
its brief and fails to read the comment as a whole.
In State v. Pearson, 680 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1984)
(per curiam), this Court stated:
The statute adopts the definition of an "attempt"
employed in the Model Penal Code, §5.01, purposed
on drawing the line further away from the final
act and enlarging the common law concept.
While Utah's statute adopts the M.P.C. definition of
attempt, the statute is not a verbatim replica of the M.P.C.
§ 5.01(1) states:
Section 5.01. Criminal Attempt
(1) Definition of Attempt. A person is
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting
with the kind of culpability otherwise required
for commission of the crime, he:
(a) purposely engages in conduct that
would constitute the crime if the attendant
circumstances were as he believes them to
be; or
(b) when causing a particular result is
an element of the crime, does or omits to do
anything with the purpose of causing or with
the belief that it will cause such result
without further conduct on his part; or
(c) purposely does or omits to do
anything that, under the circumstances as he
believes them to be, is an act or omission
constituting a substantial step in a course
of conduct planned to culminate in his
commission of the crime.
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M.P.C.

By contrast, Utah's attempt statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-4-101 (1990), states in pertinent part:
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty
of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with
the kind of culpability otherwise required for
the commission of the offense, he engages in
conduct constituting a substantial step toward
commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not
constitute a substantial step unless it is
strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to
commit the offense.
The portion of the comment to M.P.C. § 5.01 quoted by the
State on pages 8-9 of its brief refers specifically to subsection
1(b) of M.P.C. § 5.01.

The language in subsection 1(b) was not

adopted by this state.
Subsection 1(b) deals with situations where the actor has
the purpose of causing a specific result or the belief that his
conduct will cause a specific result; in a depraved indifference
situation, the actor merely knows that his conduct creates a grave
risk of death, not that it will cause a death.1
Furthermore, the portion of the comment quoted by the State
refers to a factual scenario which does not constitute depraved
indifference.

The comment states that:

[A]n actor commits an attempt when he does or
omits to do anything with the purpose of causing
"or with the belief that it will cause" such
result without further conduct on his part.

1. In a situation where the actor knows his conduct will cause a
death, a charge under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a) rather than
§ 76-5-203(1)(c) is appropriate.
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Thus, a belief that death will ensue from the
actor's conduct . . . will suffice, as well as
would a purpose to bring about the results.
(emphasis added).

M.P.C, art. 5, § 501.

The example quoted by the State involves a situation where
the actor knows that death will result as the "inevitable
consequence" of the actor's conduct.

The comment points out that

"the concept of 'intent' has always been an ambiguous one and might
be thought to include results that the actor believed to be the
inevitable consequence of his conduct."

Id. at 305.

In other

words, under the circumstances outlined in the quote on pages 8-9 of
the State's brief, the actor may well have "intended" the death;
this is distinct from depraved indifference which requires only a
knowledge by the actor that he or she has created a grave risk of
death.

See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984).
In addition, as the State acknowledges on page 9 of its

brief,"[o]nly a minority of recent revisions have explicitly
followed the Model Penal Code on this point" (citing M.P.C. at 305).
Finally, in relying on the quoted passage, the State fails
to consider the remainder of the same comment.

Immediately prior to

the quoted passage, the comment points out that where an actor
engages in conduct which recklessly or negligently creates a risk of
death, "[t]he approach of the Model Penal Code is not to treat such
behavior as an attempt."

Id. at 304.

More importantly, immediately following the passage quoted
by the State, the comment states:
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Since a particular crime must actually be
intended, the charge must be precise and must not
permit the jury to convict the actor on one of
several mental states. Thus when the charge is
attempted murder or assault with intent to kill,
it is error to permit conviction on a finding of
reckless disregard for human life (footnote
omitted) or intent to inflict grievous bodily
harm (footnote omitted). And since a conviction
for murder can be premised on either of these
mental states - as well as on intent to kill - it
is improper to say that one can be convicted of
attempted murder if he could have been convicted
of murder had the victim died. There must be a
specific intent to kill.
Id. at 306-7 (emphasis added).

This passage not only clarifies that

intent to kill is required for an attempted murder charge under the
Model Penal Code, it also refutes the broad policy argument made by
the State in closing.

See State's brief at 13.

The State also argues that in State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390
(Utah 1989), this Court really meant to say that attempted murder
"requires an intent to kill or a mental state equivalent thereto"
(State's brief at 8).

Such a position ignores the clear language of

Bell, the rationale behind the Bell decision, and the rationale of
the decisions explicitly relied on by this Court in reaching its
decision in Bell.
As Mr. Vigil pointed out in his opening brief at 7-8, in
Bell, this Court stated that to be guilty of an attempt, one must
intend to consummate the crime and that to be guilty of an attempted
murder, one must intend to kill.

Appellant's opening brief at 7-8;

Bell, 785 P.2d at 394. Nothing in Bell supports the State's
assertion that this Court meant to include mental states which are
equivalent to intent to kill; although the State claims that in
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Bell, this "Court emphasized that felony murder, insofar as the
homicide is concerned, does not require proof of any culpable mental
state" (State's brief at 7), no such emphasis occurs in Bell,
Instead, this Court emphasized the requirement that one intend to
kill in order to be guilty of an attempted murder.

Bell, 785 P.2d

at 393-4.2
The cases relied upon by this Court in reaching its
decision in Bell also refute the State's argument that a specific
intent to kill is not required for attempted murder.
P.2d at 393.

See Bell, 785

State v. Huff, 469 A.2d 1251 (Me. 1984), does not

involve felony-murder; instead, the Huff court discussed the
"logical impossibility" of attempted murder based on a "knowing"
mental state.

469 A.2d at 1253.

The State attempts to distinguish Huff by arguing that the
Maine statute has an additional sentence which requires the "intent
to complete the commission of the crime."
footnote 7.

State's brief at 10,

However, the State acknowledges the argument that the

"extra" sentence in the Maine statute is "essentially the same as
[the language] which appears in subsection (2) of section
76-4-101."

State's brief at 10. Case law from this Court

demonstrates that Utah's attempt statute requires an intent to
consummate the target offense.
292 (Utah 1986).

See State v. Harmon, 612 P.2d 291,

In addition, this Court has already decided that

2. In at least five places in the Bell decision, this Court
mentioned the necessity of the actor having an intent to kill in
order to be convicted of attempted murder. 785 P.2d at 393-4.
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Maine's attempt statute is similar to Utah's attempt statute.
785 P.2d at 393.

Bell,

Hence, the State's attempts to distinguish this

Court's reliance on Huff are not convincing.
Furthermore, the State does not even attempt to distinguish
the cases cited by this Court for the proposition that "numerous
courts have held that the crime of attempted murder requires a
specific intent to kill."

Bell, 785 P.2d at 393, footnote 13. For

example, in People v. Mitchell. 424 N.E.2d 658, 661 (111. App.
1981), the court stated:
The offense of attempt (murder) requires the
mental state of specific intent to commit
murder. Knowledge that the consequences of an
act may result in death or grave bodily injury,
or intent to do bodily harm is not enough,
[citation omitted]
In State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254, 259 (Utah 1988), this
Court made the following statement:
These terms [the four culpable mental states
listed in the second degree murder statute] are
comparable to the old malice aforethought, but
are much more precise and less confusing. The
statute treats these forms of homicides as having
similar culpability. Second degree murder is
based on a very high degree of moral
culpability. That culpability arises either from
an actual intent to kill or from a mental state
that is essentially equivalent thereto—such as
intending grievous bodily injury and knowingly
creating a very high risk of death. The risk of
death in the latter two circumstances must be so
great as to evidence such an indifference to life
as to be tantamount to that evidenced by an
intent to kill. In contrast, the felony-murder
provision of the second degree murder statute is
something of an exception to the above principle,
as it does not require an intent to kill or any
other similar mental state.

The State latches onto the last sentence quoted above, and
argues that because felony-murder does not involve a mental state
similar to that of intent to kill, the rationale of Bell is not
applicable to attempted depraved murder.

Regardless of whether

felony-murder involves a level of culpability similar to that of
intent to kill, the repeated references in Bell to the necessity of
an intent to kill in order to be convicted of attempted murder are
applicable in the depraved indifference context; in Bell, this Court
did not base its decision on the idea that one who commits a
felony-murder has a lesser degree of culpability than one who is
charged with attempted depraved indifference.
decision on the lack of intent to kill.

Instead, it based its

See discussion supra at 6.

In addition, the meaning of the quoted Standiford paragraph
is not clear.

At the outset of the paragraph, this Court pointed

out that the statute treats the various forms of second degree
murder as having similar culpability and that a high degree of
culpability is required for second degree murder.

An individual who

intentionally commits one of the serious felonies specified in
§ 76-5-203(1)(d) resulting in a death certainly has a level of
culpability on par with one who knowingly creates a risk of death.
The dictum in the last sentence should not be used as a basis for
backtracking on this Court's straightforward message in Bell,
State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237 (Utah 1978), and State v. Howell, 649
P.2d 91 (Utah 1982), that an intent to kill is required in order to
be convicted of attempted homicide.

(See Appellant's opening brief

at 8.)
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The majority of cases addressing the issue have determined
that an intent to kill is necessary in order to convict for
attempted murder.
cited therein).

See State v. Bell, 785 P.2d at 393-4 (and cases
Courts which have addressed the issue of whether

depraved indifference murder exists have found that such a crime is
a "logical impossibility" since it requires that the actor intend to
commit an unintended killing.

See State v. Johnson, 707 P.2d 1174,

1177 (N.M. App. 1985); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 310 Pa. Super. 39,
456 A.2d 171 (1983).
The only case cited by the State in support of its argument
that some states have held that the crime of attempted depraved
indifference murder exists is People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932 (Colo.
1983).

See State's brief at 11. However, the decision in Castro is

based on the court's belief that the defendant's argument was
"constructed on a faulty premise, namely, that the crime of extreme
indifference murder entails an unintentional and inchoate act."
Castro, 657 P.2d at 937. The Castro court discussed at length the
requirement under the Colorado extreme indifference statute that the
defendant intentionally engage in conduct that created a grave risk
of death to another, and based its decision on this intent
requirement.

Hence, Castro is distinguishable since no intent

requirement exists under the Utah depraved indifference statute.
Furthermore, the reasoning of the Castro court is not convincing.
Although Mr. Vigil acknowledges that this Court has held
that depraved indifference is a mental state which is equivalent in
moral culpability to a specific intent to kill (see Appellant's
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opening brief at 6), it does not require an actual intent to kill.
Attempted depraved indifference is therefore a legal impossibility.
The State acknowledges that Mr. Vigils argument is
straightforward; Mr. Vigil's argument is supported by the language
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101, case law from this Court, the Model
Penal Code, and the majority of case law from other jurisdictions.
Mr. Vigil respectfully requests that this Court follow its decisions
in Norman, Howell and Bell and require an intent to kill—not a
mental state of equivalent culpability—in order to be guilty of
attempted murder.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Vigil respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
order of the trial court, grant his Motion to Dismiss and Amend, and
remand the case to the trial court with an order that Count III of
the Information be dismissed and Count II be amended so as to delete
the allegation that Mr. Vigil committed an attempted depraved
indifference homicide.

SUBMITTED this 154&. day of May, 1991.

<^cm^
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

JAMES C. BRADSHAW
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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